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ABSTRACT
This paper investigates how monetary policy stance and mortgage market structure affect non-
fundamental house price movements in eleven Euro area countries. Based on a three-stage approach,
our empirical evidence suggests that a one-time monetary-easing shock can significantly trigger
house price booms in Euro area countries with liberal mortgage markets. Such shocks can explain
over 20% of the forecasting error variance of non-fundamental house price runups in Ireland and
Spain. We find that, in countries with more regulated mortgage markets, monetary policy stance
does not significantly affect non-fundamental house prices. Policymakers may wish to focus on
limiting mortgage equity withdrawals and on monitoring loan-to-value ratios and tax policies in
order to minimize the side effects of accommodative monetary policies on housing market stability
for Euro area countries. We posit that this is especially true for peripheral countries, which are
more likely to be subjected to overly loose monetary policy stances.
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I. Introduction
[. . . ] Even more so in a monetary union where vulnerability identified in each country can be
addressed with macro-prudential policy, allowing for the appropriate heterogeneity, while countries
remain subject to a single monetary policy. [. . . ], macro-prudential policy provides monetary policy
with additional room for manoeuvre to better focus on ensuring price stability.
– Vı´tor Constaˆncio, ECB Speech, 2015
The last few decades have seen a certain ‘de-linking’ of short-term house price dynamics from
fundamental factors such as income. Non-fundamental house prices dominate short-term move-
ments in house prices and can lead to massive boom and bust cycles. This became vividly apparent
over several real estate bubbles in the past decade. Residential investment comprises a large per-
centage of national wealth and is thus key to general business conditions. Furthermore, housing
serves an important purpose as collateral for loans. Fluctuations in house values can dramati-
cally affect the performance of leveraged financial institutions. Therefore, besides being dangerous
and costly, such fluctuations are also likely to be the source of economic vulnerabilities and crises
(Reinhart and Reinhart (2008); Reinhart and Rogoff (2008)).
The relationship between monetary policy and asset market stability is always somewhat of an
open question. This issue is of particular importance for a monetary union where all countries are
subject to a common monetary policy, because as long as the local economy is different, the common
monetary policy could be too loose for some countries and too tight for the others. For example,
Rubio and Carrasco-Gallego (2015a) illustrate how a common monetary policy can ultimately
be too loose for the periphery and too tight for the core as the domestic demand growth was
extremely strong at the periphery but very weak at the core. Such differences in the monetary
policy stance have led to varying housing market movements in EMU countries (Seyfried (2010)).
As we experienced over the first decade of the 21st century, inflation has been muted in most
countries but real house prices exhibited very different developmental paths. For example, some
Eurozone countries, such as Spain and Ireland, experienced unprecedented booms, which arguably
can be contributed to the overly loose monetary policy stances. In contrast, other countries, such
as Germany and Austria, saw very little price movements over the same time period. As Bernanke
(2010) addressed, “[. . . ], differences across countries in inflation and output gaps imply that the
degree of policy accommodation relative to economic conditions in each country can differ. [. . . ]
Of course, all else equal, a strong economy, even if its strength is unrelated to monetary policy,
should experience more robust house prices.”
Common monetary policies also limit how they can be used for stabilization purposes. Because
bubbles may not materialize in every member country, a ‘lean against the wind’ strategy may be
effective for preventing the bubble in one country while triggering a recession or at least slower
growth in other countries (Allen and Rogoff (2011)). Therefore, a successful implementation of
such a strategy may be difficult in the Euro area. We posit that policymakers should choose policy
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instruments at the national level - macro-prudential policies. Hence, this paper also aims to evaluate
the effectiveness of macro-prudential policies for preventing housing bubbles in the Euro area.
We note that most related research in this field is based on major OECD countries (see, e.g.,
Tsatsaronis and Zhu (2004); Giuliodori (2004); Calza et al. (2013); Sa´ et al. (2014); Iacoviello and
Neri (2010); Bauer (2014)). Results from studies focusing on OECD countries may not be directly
applicable to euro area countries, because of, e.g., the heterogeneous banking systems in OECD
countries. For example, in the 2000s, market-based financial intermediates held more than 60% of
mortgages in the U.S. (Shin (2009)) while depository banks are the dominant mortgage holders in
most European countries until today. Consequently, the traditional bank lending channel may be
less effective in the U.S. as the emergence of market-based financial intermediaries allows banks to
be dependent on insured deposits for funding. Additionally, Euro area countries are also subject to
fixed exchange rates. Rubio (2014) shows that fixed or managed exchange rates may amplify house
price responses to policy shocks in countries that are not small or homogeneous enough. Therefore,
OECD countries may not be appropriate samples for studies on how monetary policy stance affects
housing market stability in EMU countries.
An analysis of EMU countries has received increasing attention. Based on a DSGE model,
Rubio (2014) shows that the heterogeneous mortgage market structure leads to a different response
to monetary policy shocks. Under a similar theoretical framework, Rubio and Carrasco-Gallego
(2015a) show that a common monetary policy would be associated with an increase in liquidity at
the periphery. It can also explain the increase in house prices and stronger credit growth in the
peripheral economies during the pre-crisis period.
However, empirical evidence remains limited. Maclennan et al. (1998) focus on EMU countries,
and find that those with fixed interest rates, low loan-to-value (LTV) ratios, high transaction costs,
and a smaller owner-occupied sector tend to experience lower house price changes. Annett (2006)
finds a significant impact of monetary policy on house prices in EMU countries only for France,
Ireland, Belgium, Finland, and Spain, but not for the panel.
Our paper empirically investigates the potential adverse impact of a single monetary policy on
the stability of the housing market for individual EMU countries. So far, as we searched, this topic
has not been studied. Specially speaking, our paper differs from the aforementioned literature in
three primary ways. First, we focus on the stability of housing markets and study the impact of
monetary policy stance on non-fundamental runups. When observed house prices fluctuate to a
greater degree than fundamental factors would normally suggest, non-fundamental factors can lead
to additional price volatility. This can have a potentially serious impact on financial stability (Hott
(2014)), and, therefore, deserves more attention from policymakers.
Second, even though all euro area countries are subject to a single monetary policy, the in-
dividual policy stances are essentially different. Thus, simply using the short-term interest rate
fails to capture important differences in the monetary policy stance. In order to address this issue,
we use the deviation from the Taylor rule rate as a proxy for the monetary policy stance. The
Taylor rule rate can be used to measure an adequate target rate for each individual EMU country
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(Nechio (2011); Kaefer (2014); Bjoerksten and Syrjaenen (2000)). For example, Allen and Rogoff
(2011) and Scantee and Stoica (2013) show that the Taylor rule rate would imply that the ECB’s
monetary policy is essentially too loose for some countries, while completely appropriate for others.
As a result, the ECB rate may have a destabilizing effect on GDP and inflation in countries with
significant deviations from the Taylor rule rate. Although the impact of short-term interest rates
on house prices has been studied extensively in the literature, empirical evidence for the impact of
deviating from the Taylor rule rate on housing market stability for EMU countries remains limited.
Third, we examine whether macro-prudential policy can successfully help policymakers to elim-
inate the side effects of deviations from the Taylor rule rate, which is inherent to the common
monetary policy for EMU countries in the current stage. We adopt an interacted panel VAR model
to quantify the impact of institutional factors on the responses of non-fundamental house price
runups to a monetary-easing shock. This approach compares the impact of monetary policy with-
out splitting country samples, and it allows for time-varying mortgage market characteristics. Most
of the previous literature has studied the impact of mortgage markets by splitting country samples.
However, this may ignore the role of time-varying mortgage market characteristics. For example,
in the early 2000s, many countries increased their maximum LTV ratios. During the subsequent
crisis period, the maximum LTV ratio decreased slightly in those countries. Therefore, we expect
to see variations in the VAR coefficients.
Our results show that monetary policy stance can trigger significantly non-fundamental house
price overshooting in euro area countries with liberal mortgage markets. Peripheral countries are
more sensitive to interest rate gap shocks. Mortgage market characteristics also play a critical role
in the transmission of monetary policy at the periphery. A one-time positive shock to the interest
rate gap can explain over 20% of the forecasting error variance of non-fundamental house price
runups in Ireland and Spain.
In housing markets with less liberalized mortgage markets, we observe more limited responses of
the non-fundamental house price component to interest rate shocks. Thus, policymakers may wish
to focus on limiting mortgage equity withdrawals, monitoring loan-to-value ratios, and avoiding
the exaggerated use of tax policies. Macro-prudential policies are able to minimize the side effects
of accommodative monetary policies on housing market stability for peripheral countries that are
more likely to be subject to overly loose monetary policies.
II. Literature Review
Our paper is built upon several interrelated strands of the literature. Regarding the inter-
dependence between monetary policy and house price movements, many studies have found that
monetary policy significantly affects house prices, especially when it is too liberal. Indeed, house
price booms are typically preceded by periods of loose monetary policy (Dokko et al. (2011); Seyfried
(2010); Ahearne et al. (2008); Simo-Kengne et al. (2013); Taylor (2007); Greiber and Setzer (2007);
Jarocinski and Smets (2008); Antipa and Lecat (2009); Escobari et al. (2013)). Monetary policy
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can affect house prices through several channels. The primary one is the interest rate channel.
Given price stickiness, an increase in nominal interest rates translates into an increase in users’ cost
of capital, which in turn leads to a reduction in investment spending and a decrease in housing
demand (Goodman and Thibodeau (2008)). Moreover, studies by Bernanke and Blinder (1992)
and Disyatat (2011) show that monetary policy shocks can be transmitted to the housing market
through the credit channel. For example, a shock that tightens monetary policy can impact banks
by decreasing their loan supply and borrowers’ net worth (Aoki et al. (2004); Iacoviello (2005)),
and/or by inducing banks to tighten their reserve requirements (Bernanke and Blinder (1992)).
Monetary policy can also affect house prices by changing investor risk perceptions. Thus, lower
interest rates may result in lower risk premiums, either because of a decrease in perceived risk or
because of an increase in risk tolerance (Adrian and Shin (2008); Adrian et al. (2012)).
The key issue here is how to identify a monetary policy shock. Most of the literature uses short-
and/or long-term interest rates. Other research, however, such as Sa´ et al. (2014), imposes sign
restrictions on the impulse responses to identify a shock. A third strand uses the Taylor rule rate.
First proposed by Taylor (1993), it stipulates how much a central bank should change its nominal
interest rate in response to changes in economic fundamentals such as inflation and GDP. Gerlach
and Schnabel (2000) demonstrate that interest rate policies in European countries move very closely
with output gaps and inflation which supports the applicability of the Taylor rule concept. Using
Taylor’s rule as a benchmark, Seyfried (2010) found that monetary policy was too loose in several
countries prior to the bursting of their respective housing bubbles, including Ireland, Spain, and
the U.S. Seyfried (2010) also found that monetary policy was appropriate or slightly restrictive for
France and Germany, which did not exhibit any housing bubbles over the same period. Using a
panel logit framework, Bauer (2014) estimates the likelihood of a house price correction in eighteen
OECD countries. Using the Canadian housing market as an example, the results show that a sharp
tightening of interest rates can trigger a house price correction. Hott and Jokipii (2012) regress
non-fundamental house price changes of fourteen OECD countries on a deviation of the Taylor
rule rate, and find a strong link between housing bubbles and low interest rates. The impact is
stronger when the interest rate is“too low for too long.” However, although monetary policy is a
major determinant of house price movements, other factors remain highly relevant. Note that the
reaction of house price inflation has been found to differ across regions with a common monetary
policy (Barigozzi et al. (2014); Rubio (2014)). Some studies assess the drivers behind country- and
region-specific differences in real estate markets, and explore the importance of mortgage market
heterogeneity for monetary policy transmission. For example, based on OECD countries, Adams
and Fu¨ss (2010) find that varying housing market dynamics can be traced back to differences in
national regulatory settings and mortgage market features. Muellbauer and Murphy (1997) and
Iacoviello and Minetti (2003) argue that the financial liberalization of mortgage markets led to a
significant increase of house price sensitivity to short-term interest rates for the U.S. and the U.K.
Milcheva and Zhu (2015) study seventeen OECD countries, and show that countries with more
developed mortgage markets are more sensitive to international house price comovements.
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The argument that more flexible mortgage market structures provide more robust monetary
policy transmission is supported further by Calza et al. (2013) using DSGE models.
Rubio and Carrasco-Gallego (2015b) and Rubio (2014) focus on household leverage. They show
that the loan-to-value ratio is an important determinant of house price increases. Based on a two-
country monetary union DSGE model, Rubio and Carrasco-Gallego (2015a) study how a house
price shock in peripheral countries and a technology shock in core countries are transmitted to both
economies. In an empirical study, Maclennan et al. (1998) compare the house price movements of
EU-15 countries and show that the divergent developments can be explained by institutional dif-
ferences between the mortgage markets, including interest rate type, LTV ratios, transaction costs,
and the size of the owner-occupied sector.
III. Econometric Modelling
To estimate the relationship between non-fundamental house prices and monetary policy stance,
as well as the influence of the mortgage market, we use a three-stage estimation strategy. First,
we estimate non-fundamental house price runups, defined as the residuals of observed house price
changes and the respective fundamental part. We can predict fundamental house price changes by
using local housing demand and supply factors. Second, we use the deviation of the short-term
interest rate from the Taylor rate level in each country in order to proxy for monetary policy
in the individual countries. Third, we investigate the impact of monetary policy on house price
runups using an interacted panel VAR setting, conditional on mortgage market developments in
each country.
A. Non-Fundamental House Price Runups
To estimate for our first stage, we note that monetary policy can affect house prices by changing
users’ costs. This impacts the fundamental value of housing assets. However, additional deviations
may occur because of investors’ speculative behavior and optimistic expectations. Because non-
fundamental deviations may result in market instability and in asset price fluctuations, we are
particularly interested in how monetary policy impacts non-fundamental price runups.
As per Equation (1), and following Dipasquale and Wheaton (1994), Case and Shiller (2003),
Goodman and Thibodeau (2008), Gallin (2006), Muellbauer and Murphy (2008), and Koetter and
Poghosyan (2010), we can define a countrys demand for housing (QD) as a function of household
income (Y ), the price of rental housing services (R), and market size, measured as population
(POP ).
The price of rental housing services equals users’ costs (ρ), which are positively correlated with
the mortgage rate (Mr), asset depreciation (d), and the property tax rate (tr), and negatively
correlated with the product of expected capital gains E {p} and house value (V ). From the supply
side, the aggregate quantity of house supply can be a function of asset price (V ) and supply shift
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(G).
lnQD = α1lnY + α2lnR+ α3lnPOP
lnR = V [Mr + d+ tr − E{p}] (1)
lnQS = α4lnV +
∑J
j=1 α5,jGj
In the product market equilibrium, lnQD = lnQS . Solving Equation (1), we obtain:
lnV = ϑ1lnY + ϑ2lnρ+ ϑ3lnPOP +
J∑
j=1
ϑ4,jGj (2)
The fundamental house price (P f ) is the long-term equilibrium price based on Equation (2).
In the empirical section, we define non-fundamental house price runups as the deviation of ob-
served house price changes (P ) from the respective fundamental price changes. We estimate the
fundamental price for each country individually.
According to Equation (2), changes in the fundamental house price in country i at period t are
based on the changes in a set of local demand and supply determinants, including GDP , inflation
(CPI), population (POP ), disposal personal income (Income), housing permits (Permit), and
the mortgage rate (Mr). As the depreciation rates and property tax rates remain unchanged over
time in many countries, they are captured by the constant term (αi) in our regression estimation.
Considering the endogeneity problem between demand/supply factors and the house price, we use
the lagged variables to estimate the fundamental price:
∆lnPi,t =αi +
4∑
p=1
β1i,p∆lnGDPi,t−p +
4∑
p=1
β2i,p∆lnCPIi,t−p +
4∑
p=1
β3i,p∆lnPOPi,t−p
+
4∑
p=1
β4i,p∆lnIncomei,t−p +
4∑
p=1
β5i,p∆UEi,t−p +
4∑
p=1
β6i,p∆lnPermiti,t−p
+
4∑
p=1
β7i,p∆Mri,t−p + e
hp
i,t
(3)
where αi and βi are the coefficients for country i. The estimation of the fundamental price includes
up to four lags.1 The fundamental price change is the predicted price change (∆lnPˆi,t) where the
non-fundamental price runups are defined as the residuals (ehpi,t ). Considering that elasticity on
house prices with respect to fundamental factors can vary across countries, we estimate Equation
(3) separately for each country by means of an OLS estimator.2,3
1Up to eight lags are tested in total. All specifications yield very similar results.
2Using weighted least squares to account for the outliers during the boom periods generates robust results. We also
estimate the residuals based on contemporaneous demand and supply factors using the GMM estimator (instrument
variables are set as lagged demand/supply variables up to four periods). The results are also robust.
3See the online appendix for detailed graphs on fundamental and observed changes.
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B. Deviation from Taylor Rule Rate
In order to proxy for the monetary policy stance of central banks, we estimate the deviation of
the short-term interest rate from its Taylor rule level. We can estimate that level in each country
by constructing both inflation and output gaps, and then using the deviation of the GDP from its
filtered value as an estimate of the output gap. The Taylor rule level of the short-term interest rate
is defined as:
ri,t = γ0,i + γ1,i(pii,t − pi∗i ) + γ2,i(yi,t − y∗i,t) + eTRi,t (4)
where ri,t is the short-term interest rate, γ0,i is the neutral (nominal) interest rate in country i,
pii,t is the actual inflation rate in country i at period t, and the starred value indicates the target,
which is set at 2%. (yi,t− y∗i ) is the output gap, with yi,t for the log-transformed GDP in country i
at period t, y∗i,t is the filtered series using the Hodrick-Prescott filter (with a smoothing parameter
of 1600), and eTRi,t is the difference between the short-term interest rate and the Taylor rate (TR).
Svensson (1999) suggests that the TR equation is the optimal reaction function for a central
bank that targets inflaton in a simple backward-looking two-equation model of the economy, and γ1
and γ2 are convolutions of policymakers’ preferences as well as the parameters in the IS and Phillips
curves. Taylor (1993) suggests that γ0 = 4, γ1 = 1.5, and γ2 = 0.5 for the U.S. market. Gerlach-
Kristen (2003) suggests these values may not apply for all countries. Therefore, we estimate the
(γs) coefficients separately for each country. Considering the potential endogeneities in Equation
(4), we use the GMM estimator including up to four lags of inflation and the output gaps as
instrument variables. The fitted value (rˆi,t) is TR and the residuals e
TR
i,t are the deviation from
TR, which represents a measure of the monetary policy stance.4
C. Impact of Monetary Policy Stance on House Prices
At this stage, we combine the estimated non-fundamental price changes and the deviation from
the Taylor rate into the panel data setting, and incorporate the credit supply into the regression in
order to perform an interacted panel VAR model as follows:
Xi,t = Ψi + Ψ
MMi,t +
4∑
p=1
ΦpXi,t−p +
4∑
p=1
ΦMp Mi,tXi,t−p +
4∑
p=1
ΥpZt−p +
4∑
p=1
ΥMp Mi,tZt−p + εi,t (5)
where Xi,t is a 5 × 1 vector of the non-fundamental house price change, the deviation from the
Taylor rule rate, and the change in domestic total credit to households, current account balance,
and sentiment in country i at period t: Xi,t = [e
hp
i,t ∆crediti,t e
TR
i,t accounti,t sentii,t]
′.5 As we are
interested in the impact of variable Mi on the interdependence of endogenous variables, we hold
4See the online appendix for detailed information about the fitted Taylor rule rate.
5As a robustness check, we substitute the credit gap for the credit growth variable. We calculate the credit gap
as the difference between the credit-to-GDP ratio in each country and the corresponding Hodrick-Prescott filtered
credit-to-GDP ratio (with a smoothing parameter of 1600). When we use credit gap as a measure of credit supply,
the coefficients, the impulse response, and the variance decomposition are very close to the results we obtain based
on credit growth.
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everything else fixed. Ψi is the country-specific intercept, Φp is the 5× 5 matrix of autoregressive
coefficients, the maximum lag is chosen as four based on BIC criteria, Mi,t is the mortgage market
indicator for country i at period t, which measures the mortgage market development of country i
at period t relative to other countries and other periods and is standardized at between 0 and 1,
and ΨM is a 5× 5 diagonal matrix of coefficients.
We consider five indicators: mortgage rate type, mortgage equity withdrawal, maximum loan-
to-value ratio, mortgage securitization, and an index of government participation. Among the five
indicators, mortgage rate type and the index of government participation remain constant over time.
If index Mi,t is invariant over time, then including both Mi,t and country-specific fixed effects leads
to perfect multicollinearity. To avoid this problem, we exclude country-specific dummy variables
if Mi,t is constant over time. If Mi,t is variant over time, both Mi,t and country fixed effects are
included. ΦMp is a 5×5 coefficient matrix of the interaction term (Mi,tXi,t−p). The interaction term
measures the impact of mortgage market developments on the interdependence of the endogenous
variables without splitting the sample.
As presented in section 4, Zt is a 3 × 1 vector for three global/regional variables in period t,
which are the same for all countries. They are also interacted with mortgage market indicators.
Υp is a 5 × 3 matrix of coefficients for variable Z, and ΥMp is a 5 × 3 matrix of coefficients for
the interaction with the mortgage market indicator. εi,t is the 5 × 1 vector of error terms and
εi,t ∼ N(0,Ω), where Ω is a 5× 5 matrix. This model extends the standard panel VAR model with
fixed effects, and takes into account both the intercept and slope heterogeneity. We estimate the
coefficients in Equation (5) by using OLS.
The impulse response is essentially based on estimated coefficients Φi,p, Φ
M
i,p and Ω. The
Cholesky decomposition order is the deviation from the non-fundamental Taylor rate, the change in
housing credit, account balance, non-fundamental house price changes, and sentiment. The results
are fully robust with other order sequences. Because ΩMi,p may vary across countries, the responses
also vary across countries, with that variation dependent on each countrys mortgage market char-
acteristics. We follow Sa´ et al. (2014) and report the results for Mi,t = 0.75 as the more liberal
mortgage market, and Mi,t = 0.25 as the less liberal mortgage market. Therefore, the impulse
response function is based on the coefficients ΦHighp = Φp + 0.75Φ
M
p for more liberal mortgage
markets, and on ΦLowp = Φp + 0.25Φ
M
p for less liberal mortgage markets.
IV. Data
Our sample includes eleven countries: Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece,
Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, and Portugal. For the Taylor rate estimation, it was necessary
to use a long time horizon, so we use the maximum available time series. Thus, the Taylor rate
estimation is based on data going back to the 1980s for some countries. However, we restricted
the panel to between the first quarter of 1992 and the fourth quarter of 2012 due to the limited
availability of house price data. House price indices are collected from BIS. BIS data was not
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available for Greece and Portugal, though, so we use data from Oxford Economics.
Because our primary focus here is to analyze how monetary policy stance and mortgage market
structure influence non-fundamental house price developments, we consider country-specific factors
that can be regarded as fundamental demand and supply drivers of house prices. These include real
gross domestic product (GDP ), credit from domestic banks to the private non-financial sector as a
share of GDP, the consumer price index inflation (CPI), total population (POP ), the unemploy-
ment rate (UE), disposable personal income (Income), housing permits (Permit), the mortgage
rate (Mr). GDP , CPI, UE, account balance and sentiment data come from OECD. Mortgage
rates come from national sources or from the ECB. Credit, population and housing permits come
from BIS, Oxford Economics, and Datastream, respectively. In our model, these country-specific
variables are expressed in growth rates.
We also include three global factors. The European current unit/Euro to U.S. dollar exchange
rate comes from the OECD database. The European current unit was adapted by the eleven
countries in 1979, and was later replaced by the Euro. Oil prices come from Datastream. They
are a good indicator of global economic cycles and inflation expectations, while financial leverage
is a good measure of the global appetite for financial risk. During the financial crisis, we observed
global deleveraging (see Shin (2009); Adrian et al. (2012)) which affected the credit supply by
reducing interbank flows and hence bank balance sheet size. We follow Bruno and Shin (2014), and
measure global financial leverage as the sum of the equity and total liabilities of U.S. broker-dealers
divided by their equity. The broker-dealer balance sheet data comes from the U.S. Flow of Funds.
Broker-dealer leverage is strongly negatively correlated with the VIX index of implied S&P stock
market volatility, and is thus also likely related to global investor risk appetite. Precise definitions
and sources of all variables are in Table A1.
Table A2 provides an overview of the countries’ mortgage market indicators. The higher the
mortgage market indicator, the more liberal is the respective mortgage market. A liberal mortgage
market is characterized by a predominantly variable mortgage rate, the possibility of mortgage
equity withdrawals, a high LTV ratio, the existence of a secondary mortgage market, and high gov-
ernment participation. The data for mortgage rate type, mortgage equity withdrawals, maximum
LTV ratio, and government participation comes from Tsatsaronis and Zhu (2004) and IMF (2008).
Regarding the degree of mortgage securitization in the mortgage sector, we follow Sa´ et al.
(2014) and use the de jure qualitative securitization index constructed by Hoffmann and Nitschka
(2008). This index equals 1 if countries have a fully liberalized MBS market, and 0 if a secondary
mortgage market is not permitted by national law or regulation. Although this securitization index
does not reflect institutional changes in the ability to securitize mortgage assets, it may help avoid
potential endogeneity issues with de facto measures of mortgage-backed securitization. Precise
definitions of mortgage market development indicators are in Table A2.
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V. Results
A. Non-fundamental House Price Runups
Our first step is to analyze non-fundamental house price runups. Table A3 reports F tests for
the joint significance of the lagged fundamental factors. Total population can significantly explain
house prices in six of the eleven countries. Other factors, such as the mortgage rate and personal
income, also play a significant role in many countries. Except for Belgium, Germany, and Austria,
the seven fundamental variables can predict more than 50% of house price variance.
Figure 1 illustrates the maximum cumulative deviation from the fundamental values for all
eleven countries. The labels show the respective quarters when the maximum cumulative deviation
occurred, with most experiencing it during the mid- to late 2000s and prior to 3Q2007. Stable
countries such as Germany (DE) and Austria (AT) are characterized by low deviations in the house
price change from the fundamental change; more economically volatile countries, such as Ireland
(IE), are characterized by rather large gaps between overall house price changes and underlying
fundamental changes. This in turn suggests a large non-fundamental change in house prices. In the
case of Ireland, for example, we observe a 13% maximum cumulative deviation from the underlying
fundamental level in the first quarter of 2007. In comparison, in Germany, it was only 2%.
[Place Figure 1 about here]
B. Deviation from Taylor Rule Rate
Table A4 presents the estimation results of GMM model. The coefficients are in general similar
to those found by Taylor (1993). Figure 2 provides an overview of the average interest rate gaps
in the eleven countries, divided into three time periods: 1Q1993-4Q1999, 1Q2000-2Q2007, and
3Q2007-4Q2012. We observe differing degrees and directions of the deviation of the actual interest
rate from the respective Taylor rate. A positive deviation means that the Taylor rate is higher
than the actual interest rate, which implies a looser monetary policy; a negative deviation implies
a more restrictive monetary policy.
As shown in Figure 2, monetary policy was restrictive before 2000, as we can clearly observe
positive average interest rate gaps for all countries. In contrast, monetary policy became more
relaxed at the beginning of 2000. Thus, there are negative interest rate gaps for all the European
countries after 2000.
When analyzing the European countries, we must account for the fact that they have a common
monetary policy as set by the ECB. The ECB generally aims to conduct policies that will be
optimal for the EMU as a whole, not just for individual countries. However, because economic
fundamentals differ among the European countries (which appears to be an endogenous problem),
the ECB’s monetary policy would be too loose for some countries, and too restrictive for others
(Allen and Rogoff (2011)). In Ireland and Spain, for example, we note that interest rates were too
low during the housing boom period when compared to the Taylor rate. In contrast, monetary
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policy appears to have been more restrictive for Austria, Germany, and Finland, where we did not
observe any severe misalignments between house prices and their underlying fundamental values.
[Place Figure 2 about here]
C. Monetary Policy Transmission
At the third stage of our estimation approach, we combine the estimated non-fundamental price
change and the deviation from the Taylor rate to construct an interacted panel VAR model. The
Chow test suggests a significant structural break in 1Q2007 (Table 1). Thus, our estimation runs
from 1Q1993 to 2Q2007. After 2007, the ECB adopted unconventional monetary policies.
[Place Table 1 about here]
Figure 3 shows the impulse responses to the respective shocks. In order to derive conclusions
about the role of the mortgage market structure, we compare the response of a country with a
developed mortgage market (Mi,t = 0.75, in red) to that of a country with a less developed mortgage
market (Mi,t = 0.25, in black). We measure mortgage market development as the average value of
five indicators: mortgage rate type, availability of mortgage equity withdrawal (MEW), maximum
loan-to-value (LTV) ratio, degree of mortgage securitization, and government participation index.
We forecast the impact from the first through the twentieth quarter after the shock. The results
are based on a 90% confidence interval.
We first analyze the impact of a 1-standard deviation interest rate-easing shock (a negative
interest rate shock) based on all Euro area countries. As shown in Figure 3-1, for the interest
rate shock, there is a significant difference in the response of the two mortgage market structures.
For the country with a more liberal mortgage market, a negative interest rate shock of 1 standard
deviation leads to a maximum increase in the non-fundamental house price of 0.2% in the third
quarter after the shock. This is much more severe than the close to zero response in the country
with a less liberal mortgage market. However, the impact of a 1-standard deviation interest rate-
easing shock is not persistent, as it disappears within two to three years. Therefore, the impact is
mostly relevant in the short term.
The variance decomposition of non-fundamental house price runups, as shown in Table 2, pro-
vides further evidence that a more liberal mortgage market is associated with a stronger impact
of a monetary impulse. As Mi,t increases from 0.25 to 0.75, the explained variance triggered by
the 1-standard deviation shock increases from 0.39% to 7.38% of total forecasted non-fundamental
house price change.
Figures 3-2 and 3-3 illustrate the impact of an interest rate-easing shock by separating the core
and peripheral Euro area countries. Core area countries are Austria, Belgium, Finland, France,
Germany, and the Netherlands; peripheral countries are Ireland, Italy, Greece, Spain, and Portugal.
For the core area countries, there is no statistically significant difference in the response of house
prices to the monetary-easing shock. The response for all countries is close to zero, irrespective of
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the individual mortgage market structure. The variance decomposition (Table 2, model 2) confirms
this observation, as the explained variances of non-fundamental house price movements are 2.32%
and 0.39% for the more and less liberal countries, respectively.
However, for the peripheral countries, there is a significantly higher response of house prices
in the countries with more liberal mortgage markets between the first and fifth quarters after the
shock. We observe an increase of up to 0.4% in the third quarter. These findings are highlighted
by the explained variance as illustrated in Table 2, model 3. For the countries with more liberal
mortgage markets, the 1-standard deviation monetary-easing shock can explain 24.36% of the non-
fundamental house price movements. In contrast, in less liberal countries, we observe only 1.03%.
[Place Figure 3 about here]
[Place Table 2 about here]
Figure 4 illustrates the cumulative one- and three-year impact of a 1-standard deviation shock
to the interest gap for the core and peripheral countries. Figures 4-1 and 4-2 show the cumulative
response and the explained variance, respectively.
Beginning with the cumulative responses, we observe that the peripheral countries exhibit
stronger responses in both the one- and three-year perspectives. There is a larger difference after
the first four quarters than during the first twelve quarters, which is further evidence that the
differences among responses are mostly short term.
For example, we note cumulative one-year responses of 1.3% and 1.1% in IR and ES, respectively.
However, core countries like AT and DE show a close to zero response. Regarding the cumulative
three-year response, we observe a similar pattern for the cumulative three-year response, although
the difference between core and peripheral countries becomes smaller, as mentioned above. For the
core countries, NL has the highest percent of explained variance. In the three-year perspective,
5% of house price movements can be explained by the monetary-easing shock. In contrast, the
interest rate shock can explain a higher percentage of house price movements for the peripheral
countries. Approximately 27% and 23% of the changes in house prices for IR and ES, respectively,
are attributable to the monetary-easing shock.
[Place Figure 4 about here]
Obviously, the cumulative response and explained variance differ by country. While the housing
markets in AT, BE, FI, FR, and DE remain stable after the shock, housing markets in IR and ES,
where the mortgage markets tend to be more liberalized, show substantially higher responses. The
channel works as follows: An increase in the gap from the Taylor rule rate may result in a decrease
in perceived risk or an increase in risk tolerance, and therefore inject more liquidity into the system.
Mortgage market liberalization allows for higher leverage, which increases the risk-taking capacities
of households, financial institutions, and investors. It thus facilitates excessive risk-taking in the
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housing market. As a result, households, financial institutions, and investors may overreact to a
one-time increase in house prices triggered by monetary policy easing.
On average, the responses in the peripheral countries are also more acute than in the core
countries. Such differences could be due to differences in domestic demand. As Rubio and Carrasco-
Gallego (2015a) show, domestic demand growth is extremely strong at the periphery but very weak
at the core. In countries with stronger domestic demand, liberalized mortgage markets are more
likely to facilitate excessive risk-taking behavior of investors or homeowners.
In order to fully visualize the influence of a deviation from the Taylor rule rate on respective
house prices, we conduct a counterfactual analysis. We assume that, since joining the EMU (Italy,
Ireland, Spain, and Portugal in January 1999 and Greece in January 2001), GIIPS countries have
been under the same monetary policy stance as Germany. This implies that the ECB could either
set the suitable target rate for these peripheral countries, or that GIIPS could completely converge
with core area countries. We apply the deviation from the Taylor rule rate for Germany (as shown
by the dotted line in Figure 5) to GIIPS countries as a counterfactual policy stance. The solid
line shows the actual stance of GIIPS since joining the EMU, which has obviously been more
accommodative than that of Germany.
[Place Figure 5 about here]
Figure 6 illustrates simulated house prices under the counterfactual monetary policy stance
for GIIPS. All other contributors to house prices, including mortgage market institutional factors,
credit supply, sentiment, current account balance, and the fundamental parts of house prices, are
based on actual values. This means that the systemic differences between the simulated counterfac-
tual price and the observed price are triggered purely by the differences between the two stances.
As the fundamental value is set as the predicted value according to Equation (1), the depicted
change in house prices is attributed entirely to the non-fundamental house price component. In
Figure 6, simulated counterfactual prices are shown by the dashed line, simulated house prices
using GIIPS actual policy stance are shown by the dashed-dotted line, and historical house prices
over the 1993-2007 period are illustrated by the solid line.
Note that the predicted house price fits the observed price quite well. However, there is an
obvious divergence between counterfactual and predicted house prices in Ireland and Spain. The
divergence begins in 1999, and becomes increasingly distinct over time. By the second quarter of
2007, it is obvious that house prices in Ireland and Spain would drop by 25% and 13%, respectively,
if both countries operated under the same policy stance as Germany.
[Place Figure 6 about here]
Next, we conduct another counterfactual analysis in order to explore whether adopting more
restrictive mortgage market regulations in GIIPS countries would eliminate the adverse impact
of common monetary policy on the housing market. We assume that, during the 2000s, GIIPS
countries all featured more conservative mortgage markets, as in Germany. The counterfactual
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mortgage market for the five countries is then set as: a predominant share of fixed rate mortgages,
a maximum LTV ratio of 0.8, limited mortgage securitization, moderate government participation,
and no possibility for mortgage equity withdrawals. In this simulation, the monetary policy stance,
credit supply, sentiment, current account balance, and fundamental house price changes are based
on the actual values for the five countries.
Figure 7 shows a simulation of counterfactual house prices (as shown by the dashed line),
predicted house prices with actual mortgage market institutional factors (shown by the dashed-
dotted line), and observed house prices (shown by the solid line). As in Figure 6, the obvious
divergence between simulated house prices using counterfactual mortgage market regulations and
predicted house prices using actual mortgage market factors appears solely in Ireland and Spain,
which experienced an unprecedented housing boom during the 2000s.
As shown in Figure 7, Irelands counterfactual price is 35% below the historical price, while
Spains counterfactual price is 16% lower. Therefore, our results indicate that macro-prudential
mortgage market regulation can be a reliable tool for controlling price movements. This is par-
ticularly important if there is no convergence of macroeconomic fundamentals (GDP) between the
peripheral and core countries, because the ECB rate may not be appropriate for peripheral countries
in that case.
[Place Figure 7 about here]
D. Individual Mortgage Market Indicators
In order to derive more detailed implications about how mortgage market structure affects
non-fundamental house prices, we look more closely at the individual components of the mortgage
market indicators and how they affect the transmission of an external interest rate shock.
We also forecast the responses to a 1-standard deviation monetary-easing shock from the first
through the twentieth quarter after the shock. We compare the responses of more and less liberal
mortgage markets based on individual indicators. In the liberal market (in red), Mi,t is set at 0.75
for the corresponding indicator; in the less liberal market (in black), Mi,t is set as 0.25 for the
corresponding indicator.
We first examine mortgage rate type, and distinguish between variable and fixed rate. In
a variable rate contract, the lending rate floats with, or is frequently adjusted to, a short-term
market interest rate. In a fixed rate contract, the lending rate remains constant for the duration
of the contract.
Figure 8 shows there is no significant difference in the response to monetary impulses in the
two markets dominated by fixed and variable mortgage rates, both for the core and peripheral
countries. Moreover, the variance decomposition, as shown in Table A5, model 4, indicates there is
only a limited impact on the non-fundamental house price. Based on OECD countries, Calza et al.
(2013) show that mortgage rate type yields a considerably stronger impact of the monetary impulse
on home price, compared to LTV ratio and mortgage equity withdrawals. However, based on our
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analysis, variable mortgage rate is not the predominant factor in triggering the destabilization
effects of monetary policy on the housing market for Euro area countries.
[Place Figure 8 about here]
Next, we analyze the effect of MEW. An important feature of mortgage market structure is
whether households are able to withdraw equity due to an increase in value of their underlying
real estate. Home equity withdrawals can be used to finance consumption and home investments.
The literature shows a consistently close relationship between mortgage equity withdrawals and
the boom and bust cycles of housing markets (Mian and Sufi (2011)).
As illustrated in Figure 9, in the core countries, we observe no statistically significant difference
in the reaction to an interest rate shock between countries with more and less liberal mortgage
markets. The variance decomposition (Table A5, model 5) illustrates that the impact of a monetary
policy shock remains limited for the core countries. In contrast, Figure 9 also illustrates that, for
the peripheral countries, an interest rate shock has a more severe impact (up to 0.7% in the second
quarter after the shock) on the non-fundamental house price component when the potential for
MEW exists. This effect remains close to zero in the more conservative market, however. The
variance decomposition (Table A5, model 5) shows that the monetary policy shock can explain
over 36.49% of the movement in non-fundamental house prices in peripheral countries with liberal
mortgage markets.
[Place Figure 9 about here]
We also explore the relevance of the maximum LTV ratio in the mortgage market. LTV is
relevant because an extended ratio implies more relaxed credit constraints on borrowers. First-
time home buyers can especially benefit from high LTVs, because borrowers require less equity,
which simplifies access to mortgage loans. This facilitates the transmission of a monetary policy
shock via the balance sheet channel and the risk-taking channel.
Figure 10 shows that, in the core countries, non-fundamental house price shows a positive
response in both markets. But the reverse of the interest rate shock impacts prices significantly
more strongly in the market with a higher maximum LTV ratio in the second quarter after the
shock. In the peripheral countries, there is a significantly higher response (up to a 0.2% increase in
house prices) to the monetary policy shock in the countries with high LTV ratios until the fourth
quarter after the shock. Table A5, model 6, shows that the explained forecasting error variance is
7.22% for the mortgage market with a higher maximum LTV ratio in the core countries, while it
is 10.02% for the market with a higher LTV ratio in the peripheral countries. For countries with
lower maximum LTV ratios, the explained variance remains small in both the core and peripheral
countries.
Thus, we find that LTV plays a crucial role in determining a housing market, because it supports
a boom in the non-fundamental house price component after an interest rate shock in both the core
and peripheral countries. This finding is consistent with previous literature about the LTV ratio’s
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relevance as a macro-prudential policy tool that can be used to adjust housing market stability.
As Mendicino and Punzi (2014) show in a DSGE model, LTV ratios can be used to mitigate
the procyclicality that can arise from the interlinkages on mortgage markets. Rubio and Carrasco-
Gallego (2015b) also use a DSGE model to show that LTV ratios can be used as a macro-prudential
tool to improve financial stability.
[Place Figure 10 about here]
We also take a closer look at the role of mortgage securitization, which is designed to increase
banks’ liquidity and loan supply capacity (Altunbas et al. (2009)). However, due to the problems
of moral hazard and adverse selection, it may reduce banks’ incentives to screen and monitor their
borrowers during a period of booming housing markets. Consequently, mortgage securitization
may lead to deregulation of the mortgage market, and ultimately support overheating of housing
markets (Allen and Carletti (2006); Duffee and Zhou (2001); Gorton and Pennacchi (1995)). Shin
(2009) and Rajan (2005) note that the larger risk-taking capacity of the shadow banking system
leads to increased demand for new assets in order to fill the expanding balance sheets and leverage.
This results in securitization becoming increasingly important for financial stability.
As illustrated in Figure 11, and differing from studies based on OECD countries, we observe
insignificant difference in the reaction to a monetary policy shock based on MS for the European
countries. The explained variance of the non-fundamental house price remains small in all cases
(Table A5, model 7). The reason for this may be that most EMU countries do not allow for
mortgage securitization, or only for limited securitization, and banks in the EMU still rely primarily
on deposits to guarantee mortgages.
[Place Figure 11 about here]
For the last mortgage market indicator, we focus on government participation (GP), which in-
cludes subsidies to selected groups like first-time and low-income buyers, who influence the demand
side of the housing market. The GP index also reflects subsidies to buyers through savings account
contributions, as well as the tax deductibility of housing expenses. Thus, it describes the extent to
which the government supports affordable income, promotes homeownership, and encourages home
purchases for lower-income households.
At the core (Figure 12), we note a significantly lower impact of monetary policy in the second
and fourth quarters after the shock for more liberal countries. The interest rate shock can explain
8.38% of the forecasting error variance in core countries with high GP (Table A5, model 8). For
the peripheral countries, we observe a significantly higher response in the third quarter after the
shock in the more liberal countries. The explained variance of the non-fundamental house price, as
shown in Table A5, model 8, is 6.96% for the peripheral countries with high GP. Policies such as
tax deductions may lead to overreactions of homeowners to the housing market in both core and
peripheral countries.
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[Place Figure 12 about here]
E. Additional Results and Robustness Checks
Because deviations from the Taylor rule and non-fundamental house prices are not observable,
we first need to estimate the two variables. We note that the misspecification in the fundamental
equation will carry over into the generated residual. Therefore, we conduct two types of robustness
checks: 1) using alternative methods to define price runups and monetary policy stances, and 2)
using observed values to measure non-fundamental price runups.
E.1. Alternative Estimators for Fundamental Values
We include the dynamics in the fundamental equation by adding a lagged dependent variable
into Equation (3), as follows:
∆lnPi,t =αi + η∆lnPi,t−1 +
4∑
p=1
β1i,p∆lnGDPi,t−p +
4∑
p=1
β2i,p∆lnCPIi,t−p
+
4∑
p=1
β3i,p∆lnPOPi,t−p +
4∑
p=1
β4i,p∆lnIncomei,t−p +
4∑
p=1
β5i,p∆UEi,t−p
+
4∑
p=1
β6i,p∆lnPermiti,t−p +
4∑
p=1
β7i,p∆Mri,t−p + e
hp
i,t
(6)
The long-term effect of fundamental factors on house prices can be calculated as:
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1
1− ηαi +
1
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1
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+
1
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4∑
p=1
β7i,p∆Mri,t−p + 
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i,t
(7)
Thus, non-fundamental house price runups can be measured as deviations from long-term
changes in fundamental values (εhpi,t ). As shown in Figure 13, the impulse response remains robust.
Peripheral countries with more developed mortgage markets respond significantly more strongly
than other countries. As shown in Table A6, model 9, the monetary shock can explain over 24% of
the variation in non-fundamental house price runups in peripheral countries that have more liberal
mortgage markets.
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[Place Figure 13 about here]
Koetter and Poghosyan (2010) and Kholodilin et al. (2007) define the non-fundamental house
price as a deviation from the equilibrium trend price. Based on this definition, we can rewrite
Equation (3) as:
lnPi,t =αi + β1ilnGDPi,t−p + β2ilnCPIi,t−p + β3ilnPOPi,t−p
+ β4ilnIncomei,t−p + β5iUEi,t−p + β6ilnPermiti,t−p
+ β7iMri,t−p + e
hp
i,t
(8)
Further, considering the non-stationarity of the series, we use a Dynamic Ordinary Least Squares
Estimator (DOLS) (Stock and Watson (1993)) to solve Equation (8). Unlike Koetter and Poghosyan
(2010) and Kholodilin et al. (2007), we do not estimate Equation (8) in a panel setting. This is
because we do not wish to impose any restrictions on the long-term relationship between house
prices and fundamental variables to force them to remain constant across countries. The estimated
residuals are defined as the non-fundamental house price values.
As shown in Figure 14, the response in peripheral countries with more liberal mortgage markets
is even stronger than in the baseline model. Our conclusion thus remains unchanged: More conser-
vative mortgage market regulations can help offset the adverse impact of deviations from the Taylor
rule rate on housing market stability. The results in Table A6, model 10, show that monetary-easing
shocks can explain over 15% of the variation of non-fundamental house price runups for peripheral
countries with liberal mortgage markets. However, for countries with more restrictive mortgage
markets, monetary-easing shocks play a less important role.
[Place Figure 14 about here]
We also use a more straightforward method to measure house price runups: the price-to-rent
ratio. Rent data for the eleven countries comes from the OECD database. The advantage of using
the price-to-rent ratio is that it captures observed data. The disadvantage, however, is that it
may ignore some other pertinent drivers of fundamental price changes such as population change,
income growth, and supply restrictions.
As shown in Figure 15, the results based on the price-to-rent ratio are qualitatively robust. For
peripheral countries with liberal mortgage market developments, a 1-standard deviation monetary-
easing shock can result in an up to 7% increase in the price-to-rent ratio. In contrast, the response
for core countries is negligible.
[Place Figure 15 about here]
E.2. Alternative Estimators for the Taylor Rule Rate
Instead of the traditional Taylor rule rate, as shown in Equation (4), Gerlach-Kristen (2003)
suggests adding interest rate smoothing to the TR estimation. This means that the TR estimates
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not only relate to current inflation levels and the output gap, but also to the lagged short-term
rate. Hence, we can modify the traditional TR rate as:
ri,t = (1− γ3,i)[γ0,i + γ1,i(pii,t − pi∗i,t) + γ2,i(yi,t − y∗i,t)] + γ3,irt−1 + eTRi,t (9)
where γ3,i is the coefficient for the smoothing term. Empirically, Equation (9) is estimated as:
ri,t = γ˜0,i + γ˜1,i(pii,t − pi∗i ) + γ˜2,i(yi,t − y∗i,t) + γ˜3,irt−1 + eTRi,t (10)
using a GMM estimator with up to four lags of pii,t, yi,t as the instrument variables. Equation
(9) can be converted to Equation (10) with the relationships as follows: γ0,i = γ˜0,i/(1 − γ˜3,i),
γ1,i = γ˜1,i/(1− γ˜3,i) and γ2,i = γ˜2,i/(1− γ˜3,i). As illustrated in Figure 16, the response of the non-
fundamental house price to monetary policy shock is very similar to the baseline model. Taylor
(2007) also shows that using smoothed Taylor rule rate generated similar results as the unsmoothed
rates.
[Place Figure 16 about here]
E.3. Further Results and Other Robustness Checks
Account Balance In addition to interest rate stance and housing credit, Sa´ et al. (2014), Di-
amond and Rajan (2005), Fratzscher et al. (2010), and Ferrero (2012) show that account balance
may affect housing cycles. A negative account balance shock can be interpreted as an unexpected
increase in foreign demand for domestic assets. Such an increase could lead to booms in domestic
asset prices. The negative relationship with current account balance can be explained by Bernanke’s
global savings glut hypothesis (Bernanke (2005)). The literature also suggests that housing booms
are largely tied to investor sentiment. For example, Case and Shiller (1988) and Ling et al. (2015)
show that sentiment can affect homebuyers’ investment decisions. Therefore, we add the two vari-
ables account balance and consumer sentiment to the panel VAR model.
Consistent with Sa´ et al. (2014), we find that mortgage market development can amplify the
response to capital inflow shocks, but only in the peripheral countries. As shown in Figure A3,
capital inflow exhibits no significant influence in the core countries, and we also observe no difference
between more and less liberal mortgage market structures. In the peripheral countries, however,
there is a significant impact on house prices between the second and fourth quarters after the
interest rate shock, with the liberal markets showing a more pronounced 0.2% increase in non-
fundamental house prices. For sentiment, we find virtually no impact on the response to a negative
interest rate shock.
Constant Maximum Loan-to-Value Ratio As the de facto measure of leverage in the housing
market, the maximum LTV ratio may suffer from endogeneity, because households and financial
institutions may respond to monetary easing by increasing leverage. Most Euro countries did not
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really restrict maximum LTV before 2012, so we use the constant maximum LTV ratio (before
2000) in our robustness test. As shown in Table A6, model 13, the forecasting error variance of the
non-fundamental house price by a monetary policy shock in countries with a deregulated mortgage
market tends to drop. However, it is still significantly higher when compared to countries with a
regulated mortgage market, where the impact of monetary policy remains marginal.
Exogenous Monetary Policy Shock We note that any endogeneity between the interest
rate shock and credit supply shock poses a further concern. We follow the approach in den Haan
et al. (2007) and Milcheva (2013), and compare the effect on non-fundamental house price changes
stemming from a monetary policy shock with the effect on non-fundamental house price changes
stemming from a credit supply shock (when the value of the credit supply is set equal to the value
observed during the “monetary easing”, and the values for the remaining variables are then obtained
by iterating on the VAR). The former is the effect of monetary policy shock on the house prices;
the latter measures the responses to a monetary policy-induced credit supply shock. The difference
between the impulse response functions of the two types of shocks is equal to the response to a
monetary policy shock when the response of the credit-to-GDP ratio is restricted to zero in every
period. This can be interpreted as the response of house prices to an exogenous monetary policy
shock when credit supply is held constant. As shown in Table A6, model 14, the explained variance
by an interest rate shock in the mortgage market with high LTV and MS ratios drops only slightly
by 2% at T = 20.
VI. Conclusion
This paper provides empirical evidence of how monetary policy and mortgage market regulation
impact housing markets using a sample of eleven Euro area countries. To identify the relationships
among non-fundamental house prices, monetary policy stance, and mortgage market structure,
we use a three-stage estimation approach. First, we estimate non-fundamental runups as the
deviations of observed house price changes from the respective fundamental price changes. Second,
we implement the Taylor rule concept in order to proxy for monetary policy stance. In our third
and final stage, we analyze the impact of monetary policy on non-fundamental house prices using
an interacted panel VAR setting, conditional on the mortgage market development in each country.
Our empirical evidence suggests that a negative shock to deviations from the Taylor rule rate
can significantly trigger boom and bust cycles in housing markets by impacting non-fundamental
house prices in the Euro area. A shock to the monetary policy stance can explain over 20% of
the forecasting error variance of non-fundamental house price runups in Spain and Ireland. The
counterfactual analysis implies that house prices in Ireland and Spain would be 25% and 13%
lower, respectively, if the ECB rate for the two countries led to the same stance as in Germany.
Furthermore, monetary policy shocks are not generally transmitted equally among countries. We
note that country-specific mortgage market conditions are key to determining how external shocks
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transmit to the respective housing market. Those with more liberal mortgage markets, as repre-
sented by variable mortgage rates, availability of mortgage equity withdrawals, high loan-to-value
ratios, high degrees of mortgage securitization, and high degrees of government participation, are
more vulnerable to the external shocks that can result from interest rate movements. Based on the
results of a counterfactual analysis where it is assumed that the mortgage markets in Spain and
Ireland were as conservative as in Germany, the house prices in Spain and Ireland would be 16%
and 35% lower, respectively, irrespective of a too loose monetary policy.
Our findings offer important implications for macro-prudential policy and for the design of mort-
gage markets in a monetary union where monetary policy is too loose for some countries while too
restrictive for others. As monetary policy can have adverse side effects and even destabilize housing
markets, regulations on housing finance are a vital tool for central banks to use in an effort to close
this gap. Countries with a high maximum LTV ratio and a high degree of government participation
may need to closely monitor the housing market during times of more relaxed monetary policies,
because the side effects of an accommodative monetary policy may be amplified. For peripheral
countries, policymakers should also keep a close eye on the markets that allow for mortgage equity
withdrawals.
On the other hand, policymakers may consider macro-prudential policies useful in preventing
adverse housing bubbles triggered by monetary easing or interest rate gaps. Further studies could
extend our work by proving the causality between monetary policy and housing market stability,
as well as the causal relationship between deregulation in the banking system and housing market
stability.
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Appendix A. Data sources and Definitions
Table A1: Data sources and Definitions
Variables Sources Description
Real house prices BIS House price indices are collected from BIS and are based on
national sources. BIS data was not available for Greece or
Portugal, so we use data from Oxford Economics.
Real GDP OECD
Households Credit-to-
GDP ratio
BIS Credit from domestic banks to households as a share of GDP.
Data for Austria begins with 4Q1995. Data for Greece begins
with 4Q1994. Data for Ireland begins with 1Q2002. We in-
terpolate missing data by using credit from domestic banks to
non-financial private sectors.
Inflation OECD CPI inflation rate.
Population Oxford Economics Total population.
Population between 20
and 44 years old
World bank In percent of total population.
Short-term interest rate OECD
Unemployment rate OECD
Consumer sentiment OECD
Mortgage rate ECB, OECD and na-
tional sources.
From 2003 to 2012, we use household borrowing costs for pur-
chasing a new home from the European Central Bank (ECB).
In order to interpolate the above data back to 1990, however,
we use the mortgage rate collected from the national statisti-
cal offices of the above countries. For the remaining countries,
we also use the mortgage rate available from their national
sources. In the case of missing mortgage rate data, we use the
ten-year government bond yield in countries that have mixed-
rate mortgages as the predominant mortgage contracts. For
countries that use a variable mortgage rate more widely, we
choose the one-year government bond yield instead.
Building permits OECD, Eurostat, Ox-
ford Economics,and na-
tional sources.
Volume index. Data for Belgium, Finland, Germany, and
Spain come from national sources. Data for Austria, France,
and Ireland come from OECD. We also use Eurostat building
permit index data to interpolate when OECD housing permit
volume data is incomplete. For Greece, the Netherlands, and
Italy, housing permit data is not available, so we use housing
starts instead. Housing start data come from Oxford Eco-
nomics.
Account balance OECD Countries current account balance, in percent of GDP.
Financial leverage U.S. Flow of Funds The sum of the equity and total liabilities of U.S. broker-
dealers divided by their equity.
Oil prices OECD Price of crude oil.
ECU-Euro to U.S. dollar
rate
OECD
Mortgage rate type Literature Before 2003: Tsatsaronis and Zhu (2004); Maclennan et al.
(1998); between 2003 and 2012: IMF (2011).
Mortgage equity with-
drawal
Literature Before 2003: Tsatsaronis and Zhu (2004); Maclennan et al.
(1998); between 2003 and 2005: IMF (2008); between 2006 to
2012: IMF (2011).
Maximum loan to value
ratio
Literature Before 2003: Tsatsaronis and Zhu (2004); Maclennan et al.
(1998); between 2003 and 2012: IMF (2011).
Mortgage securitization Literature Hoffmann and Nitschka (2008).
Government participa-
tion
Literature IMF (2011); Maclennan et al. (1998).
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Appendix B. Mortgage Market Indicators
Table A2: Mortgage Market Indicators
Mortgage
rate type
(fixed 0,
variable 1,
mixed 0.5)
Mortgage
equity
withdrawal
(MEW)(Yes
1, No 0,
Limited
0.3)
Maximum
loan-to-
value
(LTV) ratio
Mortgage
securitiza-
tion(Yes, 1,
No 0,
Limited
0.3)
Index of
government
participa-
tion
Mortgage
market
liberaliza-
tion(average
of the five
indicators)
Before
2000
AT 0 0 0.8 0.3 0.19 0.02
BE 0 0 0.85 0 0.25 0
FI 1 1 0.75 0.3 0.29 0.70
FR 0 0 0.8 0.3 0.31 0.14
DE 0 0 0.6 0.3 0.25 0.00
GR 0.5 0 0.7 0 0.19 0.18
IE 1 0.3 0.9 1 0.25 0.77
IT 0.5 0 0.5 0 0.25 0.01
NL 0 1 0.75 0.41 0.50 0.63
ES 1 0.3 0.8 0.80 0.31 0.58
PT 1 0 0.8 0 0.19 0.58
After
2000
AT 0 0 0.80 0.3 0.19 0.02
BE 0 0 0.97 0 0.25 0.05
FI 1 1 0.95 0.3 0.29 0.77
FR 0 0 0.96 0.3 0.31 0.20
DE 0 0 0.76 0.3 0.25 0.06
GR 0.5 0 0.78 0 0.19 0.21
IE 1 0.81 0.98 1 0.25 0.89
IT 0.5 0 0.74 0 0.25 0.10
NL 0 1 1.14 1 0.50 0.96
ES 1 0.3 0.96 1 0.31 0.70
PT 1 0 0.9 0 0.19 0.70
Sources: Maclennan et al. (1998); Tsatsaronis and Zhu (2004); IMF (2008); Hoffmann and
Nitschka (2008).
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Appendix C. F-Test and R2 for House Price Fundamental Values
Table A3: F-Test and R2 for House Price Fundamental Values
Country Pop. Permit Income GDP Unemp. Rate CPI Mortgage Rate R2
AT
17.902 -4.391 -7.506 -10.473 0.173 -0.127 2.195
0.266
(1.007) (0.793) (1.204) (0.902) (1.127) (1.771) (0.870)
BE
0.475 -4.722* -5.275 16.184 0.240 -9.775 -0.522
0.282
(1.531) (2.455) (0.784) (1.509) (0.890) (1.103) (1.380)
FI
2.447 -16.819 -16.948 45.553 -1.165** -37.543** -0.545
0.686
(0.977) (4.821) (2.047) (1.133) (3.017) (2.761) (4.170)
FR
4.383*** 29.350 28.597 8.001 0.222** -6.396 -0.239**
0.843
(34.967) (1.329) (0.832) (6.097) (3.657) (1.538) (2.670)
DE
6.892 0.006 -1.406 3.079* 0.682 -10.064 0.207
0.314
(1.987) (1.528) (1.478) (2.380) (0.696) (4.687) (1.645)
GR
18.600** 4.872* 4.610 -19.610 -0.076 11.752 -0.905
0.688
(3.468) (2.108) (0.613) (0.592) (1.723) (1.822) (1.018)
IE
5.147 7.053* 8.230 -2.677 -0.842 -2.361 1.178
0.697
(5.504) (2.203) (1.342) (2.040) (1.370) (1.392) (1.973)
IT
2.950 -0.212** 0.661*** -2.414* 1.115** 3.409** 0.206
0.771
(4.133) (3.511) (9.629) (2.261) (3.349) (3.229) (1.397)
NL
-10.276*** 25.347 26.562* 10.571*** -0.362** 15.229** 1.203
0.779
(10.483) (1.596) (2.151) (16.376) (3.148) (3.029) (4.028)
ES
7.915*** 0.118 0.377 8.140 0.048 -7.282 -0.255**
0.855
(26.471) (5.457) (6.015) (0.350) (0.336) (1.136) (3.107)
PT
13.502 1.163 1.229 4.829* 0.110** -13.954 -0.459
0.614
(5.941) (1.648) (2.049) (2.118) (2.650) (1.308) (1.332)
Notes: Estimation for the period 1Q1992 to 4Q2012. The dependent variable is the quarterly log
difference of house prices. Equation (3) is estimated using OLS. Cumulative effect is reported, which
is calculated as the sum of the coefficients of the lagged predictors. F test statistics is reported in
parenthesis. It tests the redundancy of each predictor (four lags) in Equation (3) for each country.
R2 is the determinant of coefficients for each country. ***, **, and * denote significance at the
1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
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Appendix D. Coefficients for TR
Table A4: Coefficients for TR
Country γ0 γ1 γ2 R
2
AT 3.49*** 1.58*** 0.27 0.39
(0.22) (0.28) (0.24)
BE
4.38*** 1.47*** -0.01
0.54
(0.25) (0.12) (0.27)
FI
4.40*** 2.64*** -0.89***
0.59
(0.26) (0.22) (0.16)
FR
4.69*** 1.18*** 0.43*
0.67
(0.22) (0.07) (0.23)
DE
4.28*** 1.50*** 0.11
0.61
(0.15) (0.12) (0.12)
GR
2.73*** 1.89*** 0.17
0.63
(0.49) (0.16) (0.21)
IE
5.12*** 0.89*** -0.04
0.21
(0.39) (0.19) (0.21)
IT
4.29*** 1.31*** 0.14
0.78
(0.29) (0.06) (0.24)
NL
3.97*** 0.11 0.81***
0.14
(0.22) (0.25) (0.20)
ES
3.64*** 1.46*** 0.48*
0.70
(0.36) (0.08) (0.27)
PT 3.50*** 1.12*** -0.39 0.85
(0.50) (0.06) (0.33)
Notes: Estimation for the period 1Q1980 to 4Q2012, except for Greece, which is from 1Q1992 to
4Q2012. Dependent variable is the quarterly short-term interest rate. Equation (4) is estimated
using a GMM estimator. R2 is the determinant of coefficients for each country. ***, **, and *
denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively
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Appendix E. Explained Variance of Non-Fundamental House
Prices by 1-Standard Deviation Monetary-Easing
Shock at T = 20
Table A5: Explained Variance of Non-Fundamental House Prices by 1-Standard De-
viation Monetary-Easing Shock at T = 20
High Low
Mi,t = 0.75 Mi,t = 0.25
Model 4: Interest Rate Type
Core
1.78% 0.78%
(0.003) (0.001)
Periphery
2.93% 1.09%
(0.004) (0.002)
Model 5: Mortgage Equity Withdrawals
Core
0.97% 1.51%
(0.001) (0.001)
Periphery
36.49% 3.01%
(0.101) (0.003)
Model 6: Maximum LTV
Core
7.22% 0.58%
(0.011) (0.001)
Periphery
10.02% 2.29%
(0.014) (0.004)
Model 7: Securitization
Core
3.40% 3.08%
(0.004) (0.003)
Periphery
5.64% 0.81%
(0.014) (0.001)
Model 8: Government Participation
Core
8.38% 3.88%
(0.011) (0.004)
Periphery 6.96% 1.28%
(0.019) (0.002)
Notes: The table shows the percent of explained variance of non-fundamental house price runups
triggered by a 1-standard deviation monetary-easing shock. The absolute forecasted error variance
(in bps) is in parentheses. The estimation period ranges from 1Q1992 to 2Q2007 based on
Equation (5), with individual mortgage market characteristic interaction variables. We report
results only when Mi,t = 0.75 and Mi,t = 0.25.
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Table A6: Explained Variance of Non-Fundamental House Prices by 1-Standard De-
viation Monetary-Easing Shock at T = 20
High Low
Mi,t = 0.75 Mi,t = 0.25
Model 9: Alternative Fundamental Estimation:
Adding Dynamics
Core
2.85% 0.52%
(0.003) (0.000)
Periphery
24.36% 1.03%
(0.041) (0.001)
Model 10: Alternative Fundamental Estimation:
Long-term deviation
Core
9.66% 5.48%
(0.432) (0.101)
Periphery
15.16% 4.47%
(0.573) (0.070)
Model 11: Alternative Fundamental Estimation:
Price-to-Rent Ratio
Core
0.32% 5.82%
(0.072) (1.402)
Periphery
16.85% 0.38%
(55.583) (0.715)
Model 12: Alternative Taylor Rate Estimation
Core
1.00% 2.42%
(0.001) (0.002)
Periphery
20.48% 2.43%
(0.035) (0.003)
Model 13: Constant Maximum LTV
Core
7.72% 0.49%
(0.012) (0.000)
Periphery
4.77% 3.85%
(0.007) (0.005)
Model 14: Exogenous IR Shock
Core
2.57% 0.32%
(0.003) (0.000)
Periphery 20.99% 2.25%
(0.037) (0.002)
Notes: The table shows the percent of explained variance of non-fundamental house price runups
triggered by a 1-standard deviation monetary-easing shock. The absolute forecasted error variance
(in bps) is in parentheses. We report the results only for when Mi,t = 0.75 and Mi,t = 0.25.
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Appendix F. House Price Changes and Fundamental Changes
(Online Appendix)
Figure A1: House Price Changes and Fundamental Changes
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Appendix G. Interest Rate and Estimated Taylor Rate
(Online Appendix)
Figure A2: Interest Rate and Estimated Taylor Rate
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Appendix H. Robustness Tests (Online Appendix)
Figure A3: Robustness Tests
Notes: The graphs show the responses of non-fundamental house prices to a 1-standard deviation
positive shock to the reverse of interest rates (monetary easing). Red solid lines show the response
in the developed mortgage market (Mi,t = 0.75); red dotted lines show the upper and lower bounds
for bootstrapped 90% confidence intervals to the corresponding responses. Black solid lines show the
responses in less developed mortgage markets (Mi,t = 0.25); black dotted lines show the upper and
lower bounds for bootstrapped 90% confidence intervals to the corresponding responses.
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Table 1: Structural Break Test
Chow Test
Model 1: 11 Euro Area Countries 2.57***
Model 2: 6 Core Area Countries 1.31***
Model 3: 5 Peripheral Countries 2.18***
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Table 2: Explained Variance of Non-Fundamental House Price by 1-Standard Devia-
tion Monetary-Easing Shock at T = 20
High Low
Mi,t = 0.75 Mi,t = 0.25
Model 1: 11 EU Countries
REV IR shock to NF HP
7.38% 0.39%
(0.010) (0.000)
Credit shock to NF HP
2.50% 1.89%
(0.003) (0.002)
Capital inflow shock to NF HP
3.62% 0.64%
(0.005) (0.001)
Sentiment shock to NF HP
1.73% 0.37%
(0.002) (0.000)
NF HP shock to NF HP
84.77% 96.70%
(0.111) (0.107)
Model 2: 6 Core Countries
REV IR shock to NF HP
2.32% 0.39%
(0.003) (0.000)
Credit shock to NF HP
1.63% 3.25%
(0.002) (0.003)
Capital inflow shock to NF HP
1.50% 1.23%
(0.002) (0.001)
Sentiment shock to NF HP
3.88% 0.88%
(0.005) (0.001)
NF HP shock to NF HP
90.67% 94.25%
(0.117) (0.095)
Model 3: 5 Peripheral countries
REV IR shock to NF HP
24.36% 1.03%
(0.041) (0.001)
Credit shock to NF HP
4.31% 3.00%
(0.007) (0.003)
Capital inflow shock to NF HP
9.26% 0.84%
(0.016) (0.001)
Sentiment shock to NF HP
3.08% 0.75%
(0.005) (0.001)
NF HP shock to NF HP 58.99% 94.39%
(0.100) (0.092)
Notes: This table shows the percent of explained variance of non-fundamental house price runups
triggered by a 1-standard deviation monetary-easing shock. The absolute forecasted error variance
(in bps) is in parentheses. The estimation period ranges from 1Q1992 to 2Q2007 based on
Equation (5), using the individual mortgage market development indicator as the interaction
variable. We only report results for Mi,t = 0.75 and Mi,t = 0.25.
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Figure 1: Maximum Cumulative Percentage Deviation from Fundamental Values
Notes: The graph shows the maximum cumulative deviation of house prices from fundamental values
for eleven Euro area countries from 1Q1992 through 4Q2012. The label shows the quarter when the
maximum cumulative deviation occurred.
Figure 2: Average Interest Rate Gaps
Notes: The graph shows the average differences between the short-term interest rate and the Taylor
rule rate for eleven countries during three periods: 1Q1992-4Q1999, 1Q2000-2Q2007, and 3Q2007-
4Q2012. The three stages for Greece are: 1Q1992-4Q2000, 1Q2001-2Q2007, and 3Q2007-4Q2012.
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Figure 3: Impact of 1-Standard Deviation Interest Rate-Easing Shock on Non-
Fundamental House Prices in Countries with More (Red) or Less Developed Mortgage
Markets (Black)
Notes: The estimation period ranges from 1Q1992 to 2Q2007. The graphs show the responses
of a non-fundamental house price to a 1-standard deviation positive shock to the reverse of the
interest rate (monetary-easing). Red solid lines show the response in the developed mortgage market
(Mi,t = 0.75); red dotted lines show the upper and lower bounds for bootstrapped 90% confidence
intervals to the corresponding responses. Black solid lines show the response in less developed
mortgage markets (Mi,t = 0.25); black dotted lines show the upper and lower bounds for bootstrapped
90% confidence intervals to the corresponding responses.
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Figure 4: Impact of Interest Rate Gap on Non-Fundamental House Price Changes in
Eleven Euro Area Countries in the 2000s
Figure 5: Counterfactual Monetary Policy Stance for GIIPS
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Figure 6: Simulated House Prices in GIIPS using Counterfactual Monetary Policy
Stances but Actual Mortgage Market Regulations
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Figure 7: Simulated House Prices using Counterfactual Mortgage Market Regulations
but Actual Policy Stances
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Figure 8: Impact of Interest Rate Type on Responses to Monetary Impulse
Notes: The estimation period ranges from 1Q1992 to 2Q2007. The graphs show the responses of
non-fundamental house prices to a 1-standard deviation positive shock to the reverse of interest
rates (monetary easing). Red solid lines show the response in the mortgage market with variable
mortgage rates (MMRi,t = 0.75); red dotted lines show the upper and lower bounds for bootstrapped
90% confidence intervals to the corresponding responses. Black solid lines show the response in less
developed mortgage markets, i.e., those with predominantly fixed mortgage rates (MMRi,t = 0.25);
black dotted lines show the upper and lower bounds for bootstrapped 90% confidence intervals to the
corresponding responses.
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Figure 9: Impact of MEW on Responses to Monetary Impulse
Notes: The estimation period ranges from 1Q1992 to 2Q2007. The graphs show the responses of
non-fundamental house prices to a 1-standard deviation positive shock to the reverse of interest
rates (monetary easing). Red solid lines show the response in the mortgage market with MEW
(MMEWi,t = 0.75); red dotted lines show the upper and lower bounds for bootstrapped 90% confidence
intervals to the corresponding responses. Black solid lines show the response in less developed
mortgage markets, i.e., those with limited MEW (MMEWi,t = 0.25); black dotted lines show the
upper and lower bounds for bootstrapped 90% confidence intervals to the corresponding responses.
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Figure 10: Impact of LTV on Responses to Monetary Impulse
Notes: The estimation period ranges from 1Q1992 to 2Q2007. The graphs show the responses of
non-fundamental house prices to a 1-standard deviation positive shock to the reverse of interest rates
(monetary easing). Red solid lines show the responses in the mortgage market with a high LTV
(MLTVi,t = 0.75); red dotted lines show the upper and lower bounds for bootstrapped 90% confidence
intervals to the corresponding responses. Black solid lines show the responses in less developed
mortgage markets, i.e., those with a low LTV (MLTVi,t = 0.25); black dotted lines show the upper
and lower bounds for bootstrapped 90% confidence intervals to the corresponding responses.
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Figure 11: Impact of MS on Responses to Monetary Impulse
Notes: The estimation period ranges from 1Q1992 to 2Q2007. The graphs show the responses of
non-fundamental house prices to a 1-standard deviation positive shock to the reverse of interest
rates (monetary easing). Red solid lines show the response in the mortgage markets with a high
degree of MS (MMSi,t = 0.75); red dotted lines show the upper and lower bounds for bootstrapped
90% confidence intervals to the corresponding responses. Black solid lines show the responses in less
developed mortgage markets, i.e., those with limited MS (MMSi,t = 0.25); black dotted lines show the
upper and lower bounds for bootstrapped 90% confidence intervals to the corresponding responses.
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Figure 12: Impact of GP on Responses to Monetary Impulse
Notes: The estimation period ranges from 1Q1992 to 2Q2007. The graphs show the responses of
non-fundamental house prices to a 1-standard deviation positive shock to the reverse of interest
rates (monetary easing). Red solid lines show the responses in the mortgage markets with a high
level of GP (MGPi,t = 0.75); red dotted lines show the upper and lower bounds for bootstrapped 90%
confidence intervals to the corresponding responses. Black solid lines show the responses in less
developed mortgage markets, i.e., those with a low level of GP (MGPi,t = 0.25); black dotted lines
show the upper and lower bounds for bootstrapped 90% confidence intervals to the corresponding
responses.
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Figure 13: Alternative Measures of Non-fundamental Price Runups: Adding Dynamics
Notes: The estimation period ranges from 1Q1992 to 2Q2007. The graphs show the responses of
non-fundamental house prices to a 1-standard deviation positive shock to the reverse of the interest
rate (monetary easing). Red solid lines show the responses in the mortgage market (Mi,t = 0.75);
red dotted lines show the upper and lower bounds for bootstrapped 90% confidence intervals to the
corresponding responses. Black solid lines show the response in less developed mortgage markets
(Mi,t = 0.25); black dotted lines show the upper and lower bounds for bootstrapped 90% confidence
intervals to the corresponding responses.
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Figure 14: Alternative Measures of Non-fundamental Price Runups: Equilibrium
Trend
Notes: The estimation period ranges from 1Q1992 to 2Q2007. The graphs show the responses of
non-fundamental house prices to a 1-standard deviation positive shock to the reverse of the interest
rate (monetary easing). Red solid lines show the responses in the mortgage market (Mi,t = 0.75);
red dotted lines show the upper and lower bounds for bootstrapped 90% confidence intervals to the
corresponding responses. Black solid lines show the response in less developed mortgage markets
(Mi,t = 0.25); black dotted lines show the upper and lower bounds for bootstrapped 90% confidence
intervals to the corresponding responses.
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Figure 15: Alternative Measures of Non-fundamental Price Runups: Price-to-Rent
Ratio
Notes: The estimation period ranges from 1Q1992 to 2Q2007. The graphs show the responses of
non-fundamental house prices to a 1-standard deviation positive shock to the reverse of the interest
rate (monetary easing). Red solid lines show the responses in the mortgage market (Mi,t = 0.75);
red dotted lines show the upper and lower bounds for bootstrapped 90% confidence intervals to the
corresponding responses. Black solid lines show the response in less developed mortgage markets
(Mi,t = 0.25); black dotted lines show the upper and lower bounds for bootstrapped 90% confidence
intervals to the corresponding responses.
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Figure 16: Smoothed Taylor Rule Rate
Notes: The estimation period ranges from 1Q1992 to 2Q2007. The graphs show the responses of
non-fundamental house prices to a 1-standard deviation positive shock to the reverse of the interest
rate (monetary easing). Red solid lines show the responses in the mortgage market (Mi,t = 0.75);
red dotted lines show the upper and lower bounds for bootstrapped 90% confidence intervals to the
corresponding responses. Black solid lines show the response in less developed mortgage markets
(Mi,t = 0.25); black dotted lines show the upper and lower bounds for bootstrapped 90% confidence
intervals to the corresponding responses.
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